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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is within the jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(f), since it involves an appeal from a court of record in a criminal case not 
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Whether the Court, at a hearing on an order to show cause for alleged violations of probation, 
erred in revoking Appellant's probation and lifting the stay on the previously imposed sentence of 
0-5 years in the Utah State Prison, in absentia - without the presence of the Appellant/Defendant 
at the hearing. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Questions of law are reviewed for correctness, and the trial court's factual findings are 
reversed only if clearly erroneous. State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995), State v. 
Wanosik, 79 P.3d 937, 941 (Utah 2003). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE 
In the hearing, Defense counsel objected to the hearing proceeding in absentia (without 
presence of defendant). See Record at 91-92. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in pertinent part: 
1 
On the same grounds that a defendant maybe tried in defendant's absence, defendant 
may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a defendant fails to appear for 
sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be issued by the court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Defendant was convicted of Criminal Nonsupport, a third degree felony, on or about 
Octobe 8, 2004, and was placed on probation with the requirement that he comply with 36 months 
supervised probation, pay back child support and pay ongoing child support with regular monthly 
payments. See Record at 52-55. A prison sentence of 0-5 years was imposed but stayed. Id. 
2. An Order to Show Cause was filed on or about March 9, 2005, alleging Defendant 
violated his probation by absconding in avoiding contact with AP&P; (2) failing to complete and 
provide proof of evaluation and/or treatment; (3) failing to enter into, participate in or complete a 
program, counseling or treatment as directed; (4) failing to pay supervision fees; and (5) failing to 
report to Adult Probation and Parole as directed. R. at 59-62. 
3. Defendant was not accused of failing to pay his child support as ordered (which he 
faithfully had been doing under probation). See id. 
4. That first Order to Show Cause was resolved with Defendant having been found in 
violation of his probation as alleged {not including any allegation or finding that he had failed to pay 
child support), and his probation was revoked and restarted, with specific orders that he, inter alia, 
obtain the mental health evaluation and any recommended treatment as required, and that he report 
in person to his AP&P supervising officer on June 1, July 1, Aug. 1, Sep. 1, and Oct. 3,2005. R. at 
71-73. 
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5. A Second Order to Show Cause was filed on or about August 22,2005 alleging that 
Defendant violated his probation by (1) failing to complete and provide proof of evaluation and/or 
treatment; (2) failing to enter into, participate in or complete a program, counseling or treatment as 
directed; (3) failing to pay supervision fees; and (4) failing to report to Adult Probation and Parole 
as directed. R. at 77-82. 
6. Again, as with the first Order to Show Cause, Defendant was not accused of failing 
to pay his child support as ordered (which he faithfully had been doing under probation). See id. 
7. A telephonic hearing was held on August 29 on the second Order to Show Cause 
(hereafter referred to simply as the "Order to Show Cause"). Defendant was not present but the 
AP&P officer informed the Court that Mr. Jones had called him that morning; while the AP&P 
officer claimed that Defendant had told him to "make up a reason" for him not being there, Defense 
counsel, however, argued on behalf of Defendant and indicated that she had only been made aware 
the previous Friday late afternoon, of the Monday hearing, and had not been able to meet with her 
client and advise him. A bench warrant was issued. R. at 83-86. 
8. In an effort to assist the matter to be resolved without arrest, Defense counsel 
requested a hearing for a voluntary appearance on the bench warrant, and a hearing was set for 
September 19, 2005. R. at 87-90. 
9. On September 19, 2005, the hearing was held; Defendant was not present. R. at 91 -
92. Defense counsel indicated that she had spoken with the Defendant and that he had committed 
to be there - there was no indication of why he was not present, whether he had a valid excuse or 
some legitimate problem which had arisen precluding his presence, etc., and therefore defense 
counsel on behalf of the Defendant objected to the hearing proceeding, but the Court proceeded with 
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the evidentiary hearing and imposition of the 0-5 prison sentence which had previously been stayed. 
R. at 91-92. 
10. The Court did not engage in a careful and complete evaluation of the reasons for the 
Defendant's absence, nor did he instruct anyone to do so; instead the Court simply stated at the 
beginning of the hearing: 
What's the state's choice? What do you want to do? Do you want to 
proceed without him? . . . If you want to proceed without him, we'll 
proceed without him. I'll conclude he's voluntarily absented himself 
from the hearing. 
Transcript of Sep. 19, 2005 hearing, at p. 4-5, copy attached herewith in the appendix; motion 
pending to add to record. 
11. While the Court stated that the Defendant had not appeared at the last hearing, and 
that that had resulted in his issuing a warrant, as grounds for his position that he'd proceed if the 
State desired to, there was no inquiry made by the Court as to the reasons and circumstances 
regarding the Defendant's absence, except to ask the defense attorney where he was, to which the 
defense attorney indicated she had spoken with him the Friday prior to the Monday hearing and that 
he had indicated he would be at the hearing; and to aks the probation officer whether he 'd heard from 
the Defendant, to which the officer said he had not. Id. at 4. 
12. Thus, no information was available nor sought-after regarding the actual reason for 
the Defendant's unexplained absence. The only information was from the Defense attorney, to wit: 
that he was expected to be there and had committed to come. See id. 
13. Defendant was subsequently arrested and is in fact now serving a 0-5 year term in the 
custody of the Utah State Prison. R. at 112. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Court erred in this case in proceeding with the order to show cause hearing, including 
disposition thereon (imposition of the prison sentence) in absentia, based on the Court's presumption 
that Defendant had waived his right to be there, without conducting, or ordering the parties and 
counsel conduct, am appropriate inquiry into the reasons for the Defendant's absence. This violated 
both common law precedent and Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
ARGUMENTS 
In State v. Wanosik, 79 P.3d 937,941-945 (Utah 2003), the Utah Supreme Court set forth the 
appropriate analysis for imposing sentences without the presence and the opportunity for the 
Defendant himself to speak to the Court: 
We do not believe that our precedent permits an automatic 
presumption in favor of waiver of a constitutional right rather, we 
find that the reasonable inquiry process identified by the court of 
appeals is a salutary one. In State v. Houtz this court observed: 
A defendant charged with a crime is entitled to be present at all stages of trial. The 
right to appear and defend in person is a constitutional one, but may be waived under 
certain circumstances if the defendant voluntarily absents himself from the trial. 
However, that voluntariness may not be presumed by the trial court.... The trial court 
made inadequate inquiry into defendant's ability to appear... before deciding that he 
had waived his right to be present at trial. 
714 P.2d 677, 678 (Utah 1986) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
In Wagstaff, the court of appeals stated that "[voluntariness is 
determined by considering the totality of the circumstances," 772 
P.2d [987 (Utah App. 1989)] at 990, a standard that clearly 
contemplates some form of inquiry appropriate to the facts of the 
case, as required by the court of appeals in this case. The defendant 
in Wagstaff was known by the trial judge to have intentionally left 
the state and failed to stay in touch with his counsel and his parole 
officer, thus rendering his non-appearance at trial entirely the result 
of his own misconduct. He was not, as was the defendant here, 
automatically presumed to be absent voluntarily based solely on his 
non-appearance at a hearing. More recently, in Anderson, this court 
considered the case of a defendant who had severed contact with his 
own attorney and with the prosecution. Anderson, 929 P.2d [1107 
(Utah 1996] at 1110. Citing several cases involving wrongdoing or 
misconduct on the part of absent defendants, the court reasoned "that 
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in some circumstances, a defendant's absence from the jurisdiction 
can occasion the loss of a criminal appeal right" and "the 'defendant 
must bear the consequences of his illegal acts.'" Id. at 1111 (quoting 
State v. Verikokides, 925 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1996)). 
The foregoing review of our precedent persuades us that the State is 
incorrect in arguing that an automatic presumption of voluntariness 
may be applied based on nothing more than non-appearance at a 
hearing of which a defendant had notice. Instead, the question of 
voluntariness is highly fact-dependent, is tied to the totality of 
circumstances in particular cases, and, where there is virtually no 
explanation for an absence, requires some form of inquiry by the trial 
court. The prosecution, which must bear the burden of proof 
regarding waiver, would be well served to assist the court in its 
inquiry by providing at least some minimal evidence that the 
defendant is not incarcerated. Contact with hospitals, however, 
another "avenue" mentioned by the court of appeals, would seem 
unwarranted unless there was some reason specific to the case (e.g., 
a defendant with a chronic illness or a history of severe disability). 
Trial courts are well-positioned to assess what questions need to be 
asked and answered before voluntariness can be properly inferred, 
and we think the State's concern about unduly burdensome inquiries 
is misplaced. In the average case, the trial court may simply instruct 
defense counsel to attempt to contact the defendant or persons 
familiar with the defendant to see if an explanation for the non-
appearance emerges, and the prosecutor to ascertain if the defendant 
is incarcerated. Should those inquiries disclose no evidence of 
involuntary absence, we agree with the court of appeals that "[o]nce 
inquiry appropriate to the case has been made, and a compelling 
reason for the defendant's absence remains unknown, voluntariness 
... may then be properly inferred." Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241 at fflf 
23, 31 P.3d 615. It is true that continuances in hearings will 
occasionally be required, but they need not be of long duration, and 
we think fairness and constitutional procedure require them. 
Alternatively, at least in sentencing hearings, a trial court might apply 
a conditional presumption without a voluntariness inquiry, but 
indicate on the record that the sentence will be automatically set aside 
and a new hearing conducted if the defendant appears and rebuts the 
presumption. 
Therefore, it was inappropriate to sentence the Defendant in this case in absentia where the 
Defendant had stayed in contact with his attorney, there was no evidence he had left the state, and 
there was no explanation for his absence - there could have been a legitimate and justifiable excuse 
or reason explaining his non-appearance. 
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The Utah Supreme Court, addition to the common law analysis set forth above, also 
explained that sentencing a defendant in absentia without appropriate inquiry and findings regarding 
whether there is any suitable reason for the absence, violated Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. The Court stated as follows: 
Rule 22 states: 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the 
defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to 
present any information in mitigation of punishment, 
or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be 
imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given 
an opportunity to present any information material to 
the imposition of sentence. 
Utah R.Crim. P. 22(a) (emphasis added). The State contests the court 
of appeals' interpretation regarding the definition of "the defendant," 
and the extent of the trial court's duty concerning "the court shall 
afford ... an opportunity." . . . 
Rule 22(a) codifies the common-law right of allocution, allowing a 
defendant to make a statement in mitigation or explanation after 
conviction but before sentencing. See State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, 
1H[ 46, 63 P.3d 621. Historically, criminal defendants did not have the 
assistance of counsel, and therefore exercised this right personally. 
See generally Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 574, 81 S.Ct. 756, 
5 L.Ed.2d 783 (1961). The constitutional guarantee of a right to 
counsel has altered this situation, and counsel often functions as the 
voice of the defendant before the court. As Justice Stewart stated, "the 
defendant has a lawyer at his side who speaks fully on his behalf." 
Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 306, 81 S.Ct. 653, 5 L.Ed.2d 
670 (1961) (Stewart, J., concurring). While we recognize that there 
are times, such as allocution, where the voice of the individual 
defendant is most appropriate in the presentation of a personal plea, 
State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 354-55 (Utah 1993) ("The most 
persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for a defendant as the 
defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak for himself."), we 
have treated both voices, that of the defendant and that of counsel, as 
forming one unit of the defense. . . . 
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The State argues that rule 22(a) requires only that the court 
affirmatively offer an opportunity to the defendant personally to 
address the court before sentencing and that defense counsel is 
presumed aware of the opportunity to address the court on behalf of 
his/her client. While it is true that one purpose of the right to allocute 
is to provide the defendant personally with an opportunity to address 
the court, another purpose is to ensure that the judge is provided with 
reasonably reliable and relevant information regarding sentencing. 
See State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985) ("The due 
process clause of Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, 
requires that a sentencing judge act on reasonably reliable and 
relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing a sentence."). 
Often the specific arguments of defense counsel are critical in 
ensuring the court is presented with such information and with some 
context in which to consider it. Furthermore, rule 22(a) mandates that 
the court afford a defendant the opportunity not only to exercise the 
right to allocute, but also to present any information that might 
mitigate the sentence or indicate that sentence should not be imposed. 
Maestas, 2002 UT 123 at I f 46, 63 P.3d 621. Since counsel acts as 
the defendant's advocate, the rule therefore also requires that defense 
counsel be given an opportunity to make a statementand present any 
information in mitigation of punishment Thus, affording defense 
counsel the opportunity to make a statement and provide information 
in mitigation of sentence ensures that a defendant is afforded the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 
Wanosik's absence from the courtroom did not eliminate the need for 
an opportunity to present evidence relevant to sentencing, it only 
rendered irrelevant his personal right to address the court. "The right 
to allocution is nowhere specifically granted in either the State or the 
federal constitution. It is an inseparable part of the right to be present, 
which defendant waived by his voluntary absence. The law cannot 
force a right upon a defendant who turns his back upon it." State v. 
Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1111 (Utah 1996). However, the 
opportunity to present mitigating information relevant to sentencing 
through counsel is unaffected by the defendant's personal exercise of 
defendant's right to allocution. We thus find that the reference to "the 
defendant" in rule 22(a) includes not only the defendant personally, 
but also the defendant's counsel.. . . 
We believe that the "shall afford" language in the statute requires the 
court to affirmatively provide the defense an opportunity to present 
mitigating information concerning sentencing. Since rule 22 stems 
from the common-law right of allocution, cases regarding the court's 
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treatment of allocution are instructive in defining the statute's terms. 
The United States Supreme Court interprets language similar to the 
Utah statute in the federal rules as instructing trial courts to 
affirmatively provide an opportunity for mitigating information. 
"[T]rial judges should leave no room for doubt that the defendant has 
been issued a personal invitation to speak prior to sentencing.f' Green 
v. United States, 365 U.S. 301,303 n. 1,305, 81 S.Ct. 653,5 L.Ed.2d 
670 (1961) (interpreting the predecessor to the current Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure dealing with allocution, which in pertinent part 
read, "[bjefore imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant 
an opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf and to present 
any information in mitigation of punishment." 
It seems clear, from both the plain language of rule 22 and the 
approach of other jurisdictions with similar rules, that the "shall 
afford" language requires trial courts to affirmatively provide the 
defense an opportunity to address the court and present reasonably 
reliable and relevant information in the mitigation of a sentence. A 
simple verbal invitation or question will suffice, but it is the court 
which is responsible for raising the matter. As stated in Byars, "[t]he 
defendant, himself, must be given such opportunity and some conduct 
of the court must let the defendant know that he, as well as counsel, 
has this right." Byars, 290 F.2d [517 (6th Cir. U.S. Ct. App. 1961] at 
517 (emphasis added). Thus, we affirm the court of appeals' ruling, 
and hold that both the defendant and counsel shall be affirmatively 
afforded an opportunity to make a statement, present any information 
in mitigation of punishment, or show any legal cause why sentence 
should not be imposed; we further note that the same affirmative 
obligation exists vis-a-vis the prosecution. Utah R.Crim. P. 22(a). 
(some internal citations omitted). 
The Court erred in this case in proceeding with the order to show cause hearing, including 
disposition thereon (imposition of the prison sentence) in absentia, based on the Court's presumption 
that Defendant had waived his right to be there, without conducting, or ordering the parties and 
counsel conduct, an appropriate inquiry into the reasons for the Defendant's absence. This violated 
both common law precedent and Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
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It is true the Defendant in this case had previously been found in violation of his probation 
for, inter alia, failing to report to his probation officer, and that he had not been present at the first 
hearing on the order to show cause. However, as to this hearing, unlike the first hearing defense 
counsel indicated she had had opportunity to actually speak with the client and that he had indicated 
he would be there - thus his absence was unexplained. There was no indication, nor any belief 
expressed by anyone, that he had fled the state, and it was clear he had remained in contact with his 
attorney. Thus, an inquiry clearly could have, and according to the common law and the 
requirements of Rule 22, must have been made before proceeding in absentia. 
The Court presumed the defendant waived his right to be present, without allowing for an 
inquiry into the actual reason for the absence, contrary to the Utah Supreme Court's mandated 
approach for such situations, as set forth in State v. Wanosik, 79 P.3d 937 (Utah 2003) 
Under Utah law, there is no automatic presumption of voluntariness based solely on the 
unexplained absence of a defendant who has been notified of the date and time of sentencing. A 
reasonable inquiry, appropriate to the case, must be preliminarily made before a defendant's 
inexplicable absence may then be inferred to be voluntary. 
Rule 22 encompasses both the defendant and his counsel, and trial courts have an 
affirmative duty to provide both an opportunity to address the court and present information 
relevant to sentencing before imposing sentence. 
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CONCLUSION 
The disposition in this case should be vacated and the case remanded for appropriate 
proceedings in accordance with the law as set forth above. 
Dated this *yT" day of (M<~n , 20 ftt 
Randall C.Allen 
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
Order Revoking Probation, Sentence and Order of Commitment 
Transcript of September 19, 2005 Hearing 
^SEP 19 / l ; ; / ; ; : : 
. £ .-;c-\ r,.j;. 
LEO G. KANELL 
Deputy Beaver County Attorney 
P. O. Box 471 
Beaver, Utah 84713 
Telephone: (435) 438-6441 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAVER, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ORDER REVOKING PROBATION, 
SENTENCE AND ORDER OF 
Plaintiff, COMMITMENT 
vs. : 
DOUGLAS DALE JONES, : Criminal No. 041500102 
Defendant. : Judge Paul D. Lyman 
This matter having regularly come on for hearing before the Honorable PAUL D. 
LYMAN, District Court Judge on the 19th day of September, 2005, pursuant to an Order Show Cause 
dated August 29, 2005, and the Defendant not being present but represented by his attorney, ANN 
MARIE MCIFF ALLEN, and Plaintiff being represented by LEO G. KANELL, Deputy Beaver 
County Attorney, and the Defendant having requested this hearing and voluntarily absented himself. 
The hearing was held in his absence and the State presented evidence that the Defendant violated 
all of the additional terms of his probation revoked by the Court on the 9th day of May, 2005, and 
executed by the Court on the 7th day of July, 2005, and the Court having determined that the 
Defendant violated the terms of his probation, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, now 
pnters the following Order Revoking Probation, Sentence and Order of Commitment. 
-w?. 
ORDER REVOKING PROBATION 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendant's 
probation previously ordered and executed the Court on September 7, 2004, is hereby ordered 
revoked, based upon the rinding by the Court of the Defendant's violations of his probation as set 
forth above. 
SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the stay of 
the Defendant's sentence is lifted and the Defendant, DOUGLAS DALE JONES, is hereby 
sentenced to incarceration in the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term of not more than five 
(5) years on the charge of CRIMINAL NONSUPPORT, a third degree felony. No fine is imposed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant pay restitution for child support in 
accordance with the records of the Office of Recovery Services. 
Defendant is advised that he has thirty (30) days from and after September 19,2005, 
to make a motion to withdraw his admission or to appeal this order and sentence or any part thereof. 
Such appeal or motion shall be pursuant to the Rules of Criminal and Civil Procedure and the laws 
of the State of Utah. 
2 
COMMITMENT 
The person of said Defendant, DOUGLAS DALE JONES, is hereby committed to 
the custody of the Beaver County Sheriff for the purpose of executing the foregoing Judgment and 
Sentence and it is ordered that the Defendant be delivered to the Utah State Prison for the execution 
of said Sentence. 
DATED this of September, 2005. 
/ * - • » 
-J 
A m D.LYMAN U P .  
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of Beaver) 
I, TRICIA BRADSHAW, Deputy Clerk of said District Court of Beaver County, 
State of Utah, do hereby certify that the Honorable J. PHILIP EVES, whose name is subscribed to 
the preceding certificate is the Judge of said Court, duly commissioned and qualified, and that the 
signature of said Judge to said certificate is genuine. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the 
Court this \ y l day of September, 2005. 
TR4CIA BRADSHAW / 
Deputy Clerk of Fifth District Court 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE O F O T I H 
DEC 1 2 2005 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
VS. 
DOUGLAS DALE JONES. 
Defendant. 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
BEAVER COUNTY 
DEPUTY CLERK 
CASE NO. 041500102 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE PAUL D. LYMAN 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
2160 South 600 West 
Beaver, Utah 84713 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND SENTENCE 
SEPTEMBER 19, 2005 
TRANSCRIBED BY: Russel D. Morgan 
COPY 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
FDR THE PLAINTIFF: 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
APPEARANCES 
LEO G. KANELL 
BEAVER COUNTY ATTORNEY 
2160 SOUTH 600 WEST-P.O. BOX 471 
BEAVER, UTAH 84713 
ANN MARIE MCIFF-ALLEN 
BARNES & ALLEN LLC 
415 NORTH MAIN ST., STE, 
CEDAR CITY, UTAH 84720 
303 
1 I N D E X 
2 I WITNESS PAGE NO, 
3 
4 1 DAVE LOWRY 
5 Direct Examination by MR. KANELL6 
6 Cross-Examination by MS. ALLEN 9 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 | 
16 
17 
II 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
1 September 19, 2005. Beaver, Utah. 
2| PROCEEDINGS 
THE COURT: The state will take up the case State of 
Utah vs. Douglas Jones. Let's have everybody who is here 
identify themselves. Mr. Kanell. 
MR. KANELL: Leo Kanell for the state of Utah. This 
is David Lowry representing AP&P. 
MS. ANN MARIE MCIFF-ALLEN: Ann Marie Allen on behalf 
of Mr. Jones. 
THE COURT: Okay. Where is Mr. Jones? 
MS. ANN MARIE MCIFF-ALLEN: I spoke with him on 
Friday and indicated that he needed to commit to be here or 
(inaudible). And he said, yes, he would be here. 
THE COURT: Okay. You haven't heard from him, Mr, 
Lowry, have you? 
OFFICER LOWRY: I have not. 
THE COURT: Well, he didn't make it to the last 
hearing either. That's why I issued the warrant for his 
arrest. What's the state's choice? What do you want to do? 
Do you want to proceed without him? When I issued my last 
warrant, nobody picked him up. They just let him sign a 
voluntary promise to appear. So, you tell me what you want 
to do. If you want to proceed without him, we'll proceed 
without him. I'll conclude he's voluntarily absented himself 
from the hearing. 
A 
1 MR. KANELL: Well, we are making it sound like it's 
2 his hearing on the warrant on the order to show cause. 
3 THE COURT: Yes. 
4 MR. KANELL: Well, we are prepared to proceed. Our 
5 recommendation is the same regardless whether he's here or 
6 not. And that is, we think he should be sentenced to prison 
7 I at this point. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. Miss Allen, I assume you are not 
9 1 excited about me allowing to proceed, but I think that's 
10 what's appropriate in this case. He's choosing not to be 
11 here. This is his second hearing he's chosen not to make it 
12 for. 
13 MS. ANN MARIE MCIFF-ALLEN: Okay. I would say that 
14 in behalf of my client we would prefer not to proceed now. 
15 I If that's the case, then we will respond. 
16I THE COURT: I think we are going to proceed anyway. 
17 1 Call your first witness. 
18 MR. KANELL: Call Dave Lowry. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. Come forward and be sworn. 
miTTn -r t~vr.-rmr 
utvj EJ XJUVVJM , 
21 called by PLAINTIFF, having been duly 
22 sworn, was examined and testifies as follows 
23 J THE COURT: Have a seat up here. 
24 
25 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. KANELL: 
3 1 Q State your name for the record. 
4 A David Allen Lowry. 
5 Q Spell your last name. 
6 A L-O-W-R-Y. 
7 1 Q And Mr. Jones was in court and was given some 
8 additional terms that he was to comply with. These were 
9 terms that he was subject to from and after May 9th, 2005, 
10 The first one was that he was to obtain a mental health 
11 evaluation through a state licensed agency prior to 
12 1 June 1st, 2005. Do you have any evidence of him 
13 accomplishing that term? 
14 1 A No, he has not. 
15I Q And have you made any effort to deal with that term? 
161 A Yes, I did. Mr. Jones had claimed that he had had a 
17I mental health evaluation and just had a copy of a class that 
18 he did. So, I contacted the treatment provider, talked to 
19 the lady that actually provided that evaluation. She 
20 informed me that it was not a full evaluation. They only 
21 did what they called just a modified, and because they did 
22 not know the reason for the evaluation. She said that he 
23 1 was more than welcome to come back in. They would 
24 reevaluate him with a full evaluation and even credit him 
25 the money that he paid beforehand. And Mr. Jones was 
1 informed of that. But, as of this date, nothing's been 
2 done, 
3 Q Okay, He was also told to report to AP&P in person 
4 on June 1st, 2005 and also July 1st, 2005, August 1st, 2005 
5 and September 1st, 2005 and also October 3rd. What has been 
6 his compliance with those requirements? 
7 A Defendant has not reported in person at all since 
8 his court date. He did contact my office on a couple of 
9 occasions. The end of May, usually early in the morning, 
10 late at night when no one's there, leaving a message. I was 
11 able to contact him, finally, on June 1st through his 
12 employment. And he gave me the explanation that he didn't 
13 think it had to be on that day. So, I told him to report in 
14 the next day. He said he would see what he could do, but 
15 just never showed up. 
16 I was able to contact him again on the 17th. I came 
17 in at 6 a.m., called the motel and caught him before he left 
18 to work. Told him that he would need to report in that 
19 Monday and I would wait for him if he had to be late. And 
20 he never showed up for June. 
21 For July, some phone messages were left that he was 
22 seeing what he could do, but never showed up for the July. I 
23 did contact American Fork office, was able to get the 
24 transfer approved even with the motel. He just needed to 
25 report to their office so they would go over his paperwork. 
ll I never could get ahold of him personally, but I left 
2 messages at his motel as well as through his boss and then 
3 called them back. Both of them said that the messages were 
4| delivered to Doug personally. And no information was 
5 1 received. They held the transfer until violations was filed. 
6 Then they denied the transfer on, looks like at the end of 
7 1 August, first part of September, sending it back to me. 
8 Q Any other further contact with the defendant? 
9 A Do what? 
10I Q Have you had any further contact with him? 
11 A Yes. The day that he was served — thatfs not the 
12 day. He was served his order to show cause to appear on 
13 this Last date. That was verified. He called that morning 
14 to teLl me that he wasn't going to be here, which was 
15 already put on record. He called me back that afternoon to 
16 find out what happened in court. I did inform him that a 
17 warrant had been issued and gave him the two options to 
18 eithec turn himself in or to contact his attorney to arrange 
19 a special hearing, which appears what has happened. And we 
20 had a little discussion, as we always do. Other than that, 
21 no other contact's been made since then. 
22 Q Okay. The final additional term that was added to 
23 his probation was that he pay outstanding supervisory fees. 
24 Has he made any payments to you on those? 
25 A Nope. He has not paid any of his past or current 
ll supervision fees. There's been zero payments. 
2 MR, KANELL: Okay. That's all the questions I have. 
3 THE COURT: Miss Allen? 
4 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
5 BY MS. ANN MARIE MCIFF-ALLEN: 
6 Q Okay. Regarding the evaluation, you said that he 
7 got an.evaluation. And did he submit proof of that? 
8 A All he submitted was a copy of the class that he 
9 took. He never did submit what the evaluation was. 
10I Q And did you discover, though, that he did in fact 
11 take a class? 
12 A He did take a class, yes. 
13 1 Q And what was the nature of the class? 
14 A Urn, I believe it was an anger management class was 
15 all. 
16 Q Okay. But what you wanted him to do was to get even 
17 a more thorough evaluation? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q Okay. Regarding the dates that he was supposed to 
20 appear, the first one, June 1st, he didn't completely ignore 
21 that, he called a couple days prior; is that right? 
22 A Yes. 
23 Q And then you — and what was the nature of that 
24 conversation when he called? 
25 A He didn't talk to me. He just would call early in 
the morning and leave messages saying, Just seeing what's 
up. Seeing what I need to do. And then that was it. Well, 
he always says, Call me back. 
Q Okay. So, then, was it apparent that was his effort 
to attempt to comply or what? 
A Yeah, it would be his effort. 
Q Okay. But he did not in fact show up on the day? 
A No. 
Q And then you spoke with him --
A I did speak with him on June 1st. 
Q Okay. The July 1st date, did he try to call then? 
A He called, I believe — um, let's see — he called 
and just left a message. 
Q Okay. 
A That was it. 
Q And his report date was July 1st. Was that a day 
when your office was open? Were you in there? 
A Actually, it was a Friday, um, which I normally 
don't work. But, yes, I came in and worked that day just in 
case he came in. 
Q All right. Any contact in August? 
A No. No contact. 
Q Have you had a chance to have a conversation with 
the victim, his ex-wife, about the situation? 
A I have. 
1 n 
1 Q And has she expressed any desires like that she has 
2 appreciated the money that's been coming in, like that's 
3 been helpful to her, anything like that? 
4 A Yeah. She's very appreciative of the money that 
5 she's been receiving. And she's also made the comment that 
6 she knows that he's also got to comply with other things as 
7 well. 
8I Q Now, did — as far as you know, the garnishment has 
91 been going as planned over the past several months? 
10 1 A Yes. I have spoken with his employer on several 
111 occasions. And they do take the checks. 
12 1 Q Okay. So, that's been going smoothly? She's been 
13 1 getting the money? There's been no problem with that? 
14 A Yes. 
15 MS. ANN MARIE MCIFF-ALLEN: Okay. All right. That' 
16 all my questions. 
17 THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Kanell? 
18 MR. KANELL: Nothing further. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. You may have a seat. 
20 MR. KANELL: That's all the evidence that we'll 
211 present. 
22 THE COURT: Miss Allen, do you want to present 
23 anything? 
24 MS. ANN MARIE MCIFF-ALLEN: No. Thank you. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Kanell, I'll hear you. 
1 MR. KANELL: This is kind of a difficult situation, 
2 because he1 s just really kind of playing a game with us on 
3 these little minor things that he doesn't want to comply 
4 with. And he has been paying his child support, which that's 
5 1 been beneficial. But I just don't see any other way really. 
6 I don't think he'll spend much time in prison, but 
7 unsupervised by a parole officer and kind of move it out of 
8 our hands here. Won't have to be the ones talking to him and 
9 complaining about us having personal biases in his case and 
10 J things like that. So, that's our recommendation. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. Miss Allen. 
12 MS. ANN MARIE MCIFF-ALLEN: I agree with Mr. Allen, 
13 it is a difficult situation. There's very little excuse for 
14 1 Mr. Jones not complying to the letter as this court directed 
15 him. I must say, however, that it is extremely beneficial 
16 for his ex-wife and children to have that money. And when we 
17 punish Mr. Jones we also punish them. And that's very 
18 unfortunate for them. 
19 1 In speaking with his ex-wife, she has appreciated 
20 1 money. It has been a help to her. So, if the court does 
21 sentence him to prison, that will be a hardship for her and 
22 for her children. 
23 Also, I wanted to raise one other concern. When we 
24 held the last hearing, of course, the court's aware I was 
25 not given notice. Had I been here, I don't know if things 
1 would have gone any differently. But I do think that it's 
2 useful for a person like Mr. Jones to have someone who he 
3 perceives is his ally, advise him and admonish him and help 
4 J him to understand the consequences of his actions. He is 
5 the type of person, I believe, who is wary of authority and 
6 may question the directives that he's given. And were I 
7 able to advise him as his ally he may have been more 
8 1 compliant. So I feel it's unfortunate that I was not given 
91 notice of that hearing. So, what I would ask on behalf of 
10 1 Mr. Jones is that he be given some additional time to bring 
111 himself into compliance with the order of this court. 
12 THE COURT: I need to go check the record. I read 
13 through everything I have done today. Do you want to respond 
14 to anything that she said or not, Mr. Kanell? 
15 MR. KANELL: No. 
16 THE COURT: In looking at it, this is the second 
17 order to show cause that we are back here on. In the last 
18 one, you were not notified. He asked for a public defender. 
19 I had him fill out an affidavit. He's making simply too much 
20 money. At that point, I told him he wasn't going to qualify 
21 for a public defender and asked him if he wanted additional 
22 time or what he wanted to do. He said he didn't. He wanted 
23 to go forward. 
24 His father was with him at the time. And throughout 
25 the hearing his father actually did testify on his behalf 
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when we got to deciding what we were going to do in this 
case. So, it wasn't as if he were without counsel, because 
I simply found that he is making too much money. He's got a 
good job. 
What he's choosing to do is, he's choosing to live 
in this Motel 6, which is fine if you want to do that. It 
violates probation's rules. I didn't tell him he had to 
stop. But what it does, it costs him more money than if he 
owned a house. And I told him it was a dumb way to do 
things. And I think it is a stupid way to do things. 
He likes to play the martyr. He likes to play the 
victim. And he's not. He simply is not a victim in this 
case. I made it absolutely crystal clear that he was to 
show up in person on the first of every month. We even went 
to the point of finding out what day of the week each first 
of the month was for six months so that we could see if 
there was a conflict. And I went over each month with him, 
or with me so I could say, is there going to be a problem 
with him reporting. Tell him that we transferred it to 
American Fork, the purpose being to get rid of any potential 
bias, like Mr. Kanell just brought up. 
All he had to do was show up. If he showed up, it 
would have been transferred. He chose not to do that. He 
was told that. In other words, I did everything I could 
last time to say we are not going to do -- and I punished 
I 
1 him in no way. I gave him no punishment at the last 
2 hearing. I told him this was his last chance. He gets no 
3 additional chances. So, his response was he didn't get the 
4 evaluation completed. And I can't remember whether he 
5 discussed the status of it or not. But it clearly wasn't 
6 completed. And he knows about that. He simply failed to 
7 1 appear on those six — on those three days that's been 
8 alleged. He simply failed to appear. He was told to call 
9 up — he has to appear in person. 
10 The whole point of making these guys appear in 
11 person, in my mind, is to have the AP&P guy look at him and 
12 do some kind of a once-over. Is he looking like he's doing 
13 meth? Is he looking like he's on heroin? Is he looking 
14 like he's on drugs? You know, is he clean? What's he look 
15 like? And a visual is so much better than a phone message 
16 at 6 a.m. in the morning. I treat a phone message at 6 a.m. 
17 in the morning as an attempt to try to get out of appearing. 
18 Mr. Lowry has been willing to come in on days when it wasn't 
19 his day. He's been willing to arrange anything. And all of 
20 this could have been transferred to American Fork which 
21 would have made it much easier, because I think this Motel 6 
22 is the one somewhere near American Fork or Lehi. I'm not 
23 exactly sure where it is. But it's right up there. I think 
24 it's that one on the freeway by Lehi. But I am not 
25 positive. Okay. So, it's right where he works, bottom 
line. 
2I And he's made no attempt to pay supervision fees. I 
3 1 do not find that he has made any effort to comply at all, 
4 Now, what to do. And as I thought about this before 
5I I came here today, having done nothing the last time and 
61 simply said, all right. Let's make sure it's crystal clear, 
7 I decided I would see what he had to say today. In my 
8 J personal notes, I wrote down he ought to go to jail or 
9 prison. I don't know how much jail time I would have 
10 ordered had he appeared, but something to try to get his 
11 attention to let him know we are actually serious about this 
12 thing. But when someone simply fails to appear, and this is 
13 the second time he's failed to appear, I have no choice in 
14 my mind but to let him know that we are serious about this. 
15 At this point, I am going to lift the stay on his 
16 prison term. He's no longer on probation. I'm going to 
17 issue a commitment order. He's committed to the Utah State 
18 Prison to serve up to five years. I don't know, Mr. Kanell, 
19 how long he's going to actually serve. I imagine a lot will 
20 depend on his attitude. When he shows up, and when he does 
21 and whether or not he hides between now and when he gets 
22 picked up, I don't know for sure what he is going to do nor 
23 does it matter too much at this point. He simply has failed 
24 to comply. He should have been here 40 minutes ago, 35 
25 minutes ago. He's not here. He hasn't contacted his 
\ 
1 lawyer. He hasn't contacted his probation officer. I have 
2 no reason to believe that he is just willfully deciding not 
3 to be here. Consequently, prepare a commitment order he'll 
4 1 go to the Utah State Prison. He's ordered to be picked up. 
5 This is a no-bail situation because I'm ordering a 
6 commitment. 
7 Anything else, Mr. Kanell? 
8 MR. KANELL: Can you put a recommendation in there 
9 that he be given a mental health evaluation? 
10 THE COURT: You can send any letter you want up to 
11 the parole board, have them take a look at it. I'm not 
12 putting anything — I don't know that this man has a mental 
13 health problem. I think what he's got is what I refer to as 
14 an obedience problem. He just doesn't want to obey the law. 
15 I And that's it. And then people like that — 
16 MR. KANELL: Can I put a statement in there about the 
17 restitution? 
18 THE COURT: You can put any statement you want. I'm 
19 1 not reducing -- he's still ordered to pay everything as far 
20 as fines — not fines. I'm not changing the fines. Fines 
21 will stay stayed. But with regard to restitution, that all 
22 stays. He still owes the money. Every bit of everything is 
23 still there. I'm not going to change a bit of that. But I 
24 am going to lift the stay. And he is no longer on probation. 
25 And he needs to go to prison. 
Thank you very much for being here. Miss Allen 
Hope it didn't cost you too much to get here. 
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